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DON’T GROUND ME BRO! PRIVATE OWNERSHIP OF
AIRSPACE AND HOW IT INVALIDATES THE FAA’S BLANKET
PROHIBITION ON LOW ALTITUDE COMMERCIAL DRONE
OPERATIONS
Pierce Giboney
Abstract
In years past, society has typically associated the word “drone” with
the War on Terror and far-off battlefields. With the advent of the smart
phone revolution, however, the once prohibitive costs of the technology
have decreased to a level the general public can afford. As a consequence,
a rising number of entrepreneurs associate the word “drone” with
opportunity—a means of reaching a new commercial frontier, provided
they can get off the ground.
Purportedly due to the lack of a regulatory framework governing the
new technology, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has
essentially prohibited the use of drones at any altitude for “business
purposes.” With the prohibition likely to remain in place for the
foreseeable future, many of these would-be entrepreneurs choose to fly
in open defiance of the FAA. Some of these drone pilots challenge
whether the FAA even possesses the authority to impose the prohibition.
The FAA responds to these challenges by insisting that it alone has the
power to regulate the safety of all airspace “from the ground up.”
While the U.S. Supreme Court has held that landowners retain a right
to own the “superadjacent” airspace above their property, the Court has
left undefined the precise limits of superadjacent airspace. However,
utilizing drones provides an opportunity to define “superadjacent” and,
more importantly, establish the outer limits of the FAA’s authority over
the lower airspace. This Note argues that the FAA’s broad interpretation
of its authority cannot be reconciled with the Supreme Court decisions
regarding landowners’ rights to own airspace above their property. This
Note concludes that given the Supreme Court precedent, the FAA’s
blanket prohibition on the use of drones for “business purposes” is an
invalid exercise of its authority.
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INTRODUCTION
Louisiana farmers have a problem: feral hogs are ravaging their crops
and farmland. This problem is serious enough that Louisiana allows
people to hunt feral hogs almost without restriction.1 The relatively loose
hunting restrictions, however, have been largely ineffective in checking
the feral hog population.2 Intelligent enough to know that farmers will
shoot them during the daytime, feral hogs often wait until dark before
coming out to eat.3 With hunting and trapping proving to be inefficient,
and other means of control being prohibitively expensive (e.g., hunting
from helicopters), the noxious beasts appeared to be winning the war
against their predators.4
Enter Cy Brown’s “Dehogiflier,” a homemade drone equipped with a
thermal imaging camera.5 Where the feral hog once used the heavy
Louisiana brush and cover of darkness to evade their human predators,
Brown and his team tipped the balance in favor of the farmers. He was so
successful that the U.S. Department of Agriculture expressed an interest
in adopting Brown’s method.6 The victory would prove to be short-lived:
the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) grounded Brown’s operation,
and the feral hog, once again, reigns supreme over the Louisiana farmer.7
Cy Brown is not alone. The FAA has grounded virtually any private
individual or organization utilizing drones for commercial purposes.8
Understandably, the subjects of the FAA’s blanket prohibition on flying
drones—specifically, those flying drones at lower altitudes—have
questioned the FAA’s justifications for doing so.
One drone enthusiast, however, raised a more fundamental question.
In response to a $10,000 enforcement action, Raphael Pirker questioned
1. Michael Perot, Coping with Feral Hogs, LA. DEP’T OF WILDLIFE & FISHERIES,
http://www.wlf.louisiana.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/publication/32954-feral-hogs/feral_hogs.pdf
(last visited Oct. 14, 2015).
2. Julia O’Donoghue, Feral Hogs, the Unpopular Affordable Care Act and Smoking
Restrictions: Capitol Digest, TIMES PICAYUNE (Apr. 04, 2014, 7:48 PM),
http://www.nola.com/politics/index.ssf/2014/04/capitol_digest_april_4.html (“[Feral hogs] are
prolific breeders. Experts say 75 percent of the wild hog population would have to be killed just
to keep it to current levels.”).
3. Id.
4. Jesse Hirsch, Hunting Wild Pigs with Drones, MOD. FARMER (Apr. 18, 2013),
http://modernfarmer.com/2013/04/hunting-pigs-with-drones/.
5. Id.
6. Drone Wars: Who Owns the Air?, NPR (May 30, 2014, 3:03 AM),
http://www.npr.org/templates/transcript/transcript.php?storyId=317074394.
7. Id.
8. See, e.g., Nick Bilton, Delivery Drones Grounded by F.A.A., N.Y. TIMES: BITS (June
25, 2014, 7:15 AM), http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/06/25/delivery-drones-grounded-by-f-aa/; Heather Kelly, Beer-Delivery Drone Grounded by FAA, CNN (Feb. 3, 2014, 10:03 AM),
http://www.cnn.com/2014/01/31/tech/innovation/beer-drone-faa/.
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not only whether the FAA was justified in imposing the fine, but whether
the FAA even possessed the authority to do so.9 Specifically, Pirker
maintained that the FAA lacked any jurisdictional authority to regulate
aircraft, or even the airspace itself, below what the U.S. Supreme Court
has declared to be in the public domain.10 In doing so, Pirker raised an
old but ultimately unsettled issue: If a landowner maintains a property
interest in the “superadjacent” airspace above her land, to what height
does that interest extend? More importantly, what limitations does this
impose on the FAA’s ability to regulate drones flying within that
airspace? Answering those questions may prove critical in determining
whether the FAA may ground operations such as Pirker’s for the
foreseeable future.
Part I of this Note introduces the current costs and capabilities of
drone technology, provides insight into the adversarial relationship
developing between drone enthusiasts and the FAA, and concludes with
the facts and arguments raised in Huerta v. Pirker. Part II identifies the
primary arguments the FAA raises to justify the prohibition and how
those arguments relate to statutes governing the agency. Part III argues
that the FAA’s broad interpretation of its own regulatory authority cannot
be reconciled with the landowner’s right to privately own and develop
airspace above his property, as established by the Supreme Court. Part IV
reconciles the FAA’s regulatory authority with the right to privately own
airspace and argues that the FAA cannot sustain its prohibition even
under the broadest possible interpretation.
I. DRONE TECHNOLOGY AND REGULATION
The FAA broadly defines “drone,” or unmanned aircraft, as “a device
that is used, or is intended to be used, for flight in the air with no onboard
pilot.”11 The definition encompasses drones as simple as remotely
controlled model aircrafts to complex drones used for sophisticated aerial
surveillance over hostile areas.12 Drone weights currently range from as
small as four ounces to over 32,000 pounds, with wingspans varying from
six inches to over 240 feet.13
As recently as ten years ago, the prohibitive cost of the technology
(some of it classified) limited the use of drones largely to military
9. See infra Section I.D.
10. Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss at 10, Huerta v. Pirker, No. CP-217 (N.T.S.B. Sept.
27, 2013) [hereinafter Pirker MTD], available at http://www.kramerlevin.com/files/upload/FAAv-Pirker.pdf.
11. Unmanned Aircraft Operations in the National Airspace System (UAONAS), 72 Fed.
Reg. 6689, 6689 (Feb. 13, 2007).
12. Id.
13. Unmanned Aircraft System Test Sites, 77 Fed. Reg. 14,319, 14,319 (Mar. 9, 2012).
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applications.14 With the advent of the smart phone revolution, however,
the costs of essential drone components, such as accelerometers,
gyroscopes, and GPS trackers, have decreased to a level the general
public can afford.15 Consequently, where an advanced flight control
system would have formerly cost between $5000 and $10,000, an entire
drone flight platform—capable of flying twenty-two miles per hour and
at altitudes up to 1000 feet—only costs $489 online.16 Drones of more
limited capabilities, albeit still equipped with video cameras and other
gadgets, cost less than $100 online.17
Moreover, as costs have decreased, the technological capabilities of
drones continue to dramatically increase. For instance, manufacturers can
equip drones with state-of-the-art high-resolution cameras capable of
viewing an object as small as six inches from 17,000 feet in the air.18 The
Wireless Aerial Surveillance Platform, WASP), a drone weighing only
fourteen pounds with a six-foot wingspan, is capable of not only hacking
into personal Wi-Fi networks, but also rerouting and recording outgoing
phone calls and text messages.19
A. Civil Drones: Proliferation and Projected Economic Impact
The FAA estimates that “some 100 U.S. companies, academic
institutions, and government organizations are developing over 300
[drone] designs.”20 Though the FAA characterizes the number of units as
14. Ben Popper, Drones over US Soil: The Calm Before the Swarm, VERGE (Mar. 19, 2013,
1:00 PM), http://www.theverge.com/2013/3/19/4120548/calm-before-the-swarm-domesticdrones-are-here; see also UAONAS, 72 Fed. Reg. at 6689 (“The most common public use of
unmanned aircraft today in the United States is by the Department of Defense.”); Oren Gross, The
New Way of War: Is There a Duty to Use Drones?, 67 FLA. L. REV. 1, 1 (2015) (noting that drones
“have become the poster child for America’s continuing fight against terrorism”).
15. Popper, supra note 14.
16. Id.; see also, e.g., DJI Phantom Aerial UAV Drone Quadcopter for GoPro,
AMAZON.COM, http://www.amazon.com/DJI-Phantom-Aerial-Drone-Quadcopter/dp/B00AGOS
QI8 (last visited Oct. 14, 2015) (showing the price of a drone on Amazon.com). This price of
$489 was current as of the time of this Note. The price is subject to change.
17. See, e.g., UDI U818A 2.4GHz 4 CH 6 Axis Gyro RC Quadcopter with Camera RTF
Mode 2, AMAZON.COM, http://www.amazon.com/U818A-2-4GHz-Axis-Quadcopter-Camera/dp/
B00D3IN11Q/ (last visited Oct. 14, 2015).
18. See Ryan Gallagher, Could the Pentagon’s 1.8 Gigapixel Drone Camera Be Used for
Domestic Surveillance?, SLATE (Feb. 6, 2013, 10:14 AM), http://www.slate.com/blogs/
future_tense/2013/02/06/argus_is_could_the_pentagon_s_1_8_gigapixel_drone_camera_be_use
d_for_domestic.html.
19. See Andy Greenberg, Flying Drone Can Crack Wi-Fi Networks, Snoop on Cell Phones,
FORBES (July 28, 2011, 2:11 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/andygreenberg/2011/07/28/
flying-drone-can-crack-wifi-networks-snoop-on-cell-phones/.
20. U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., FED. AVIATION ADMIN., FAA AEROSPACE FORECAST: FISCAL
YEARS 2010–2030, at 48 (2010), available at http://www.faa.gov/data_research/aviation/
aerospace_forecasts/2010-2030/media/2010%20Forecast%20Doc.pdf.
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“small,” it forecasts that 30,000 drones will be flying over the United
States by 2030.21 Where drones were once almost exclusively a
government endeavor, everyone from real estate photographers to
multinational corporations has recognized and seized on the affordability
and rapidly increasing commercial (and noncommercial) potential of
drone technology.
Though drones already play a significant role in the public sphere
(e.g., law enforcement, firefighting, border patrol, search and rescue22),
“their application in commercial or civil use is equally diverse.”23 In the
United States, both Amazon and Google are investing in and making
headway with this technology. To reduce shipping costs and compete
with the same-day delivery capabilities of its rivals, Amazon is currently
developing and testing a drone-based delivery system.24 The purported
goal of Amazon’s drone delivery system, Amazon Prime Air, is to “get
packages into customers’ hands in 30 minutes or less using small
unmanned aerial vehicles.”25 Amazon insists that Prime Air will be a
delivery option “when and where we have the regulatory support needed
to realize our vision.”26 Google is experimenting with a drone delivery
system of its own. In August 2014, Google’s five-foot-wide drone
prototype delivered candy, dog treats, cattle vaccines, water, and radios
to farmers in Queensland, Australia.27 The “DomiCopter,” a drone
developed by Domino’s Pizza, successfully delivered two pizzas in the
United Kingdom last year.28 Other commercial applications include

21. Id.
22. See Fact Sheet—Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS), FED. AVIATION ADMIN. (Jan. 6,
2014), http://www.faa.gov/news/fact_sheets/news_story.cfm?newsId=14153 [hereinafter FAA
Fact Sheet].
23. UAONAS, 72 Fed. Reg. 6689, 6689 (Feb. 13, 2007).
24. See Jillian D’Onfro, Why Amazon Needs Drones More Than People Realize, BUS.
INSIDER (July 30, 2014, 6:23 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/amazon-drones-2014-7.
25. Amazon Prime Air, AMAZON.COM, http://www.amazon.com/b?ie=UTF8&node=
8037720011 (last visited Oct. 14, 2015).
26. Id.
27. Alistair Barr & Greg Bensinger, Google Is Testing Delivery Drone System, WALL ST. J.
(Aug. 29, 2014, 4:04 AM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/google-reveals-delivery-drone-project1409274480.
28. Julianne Pepitone, Domino’s Tests Drone Pizza Delivery, CNN MONEY (June 4, 2013,
6:29 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2013/06/04/technology/innovation/dominos-pizza-drone/index.
html.
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filmmaking,29 real estate,30 and agriculture.31
The FAA predicts that yearly spending on drones will double from
$5.2 billion to $11.6 billion, increasing to more than $89 billion in the
next decade.32 A 2013 research study conducted by the Association for
Unmanned Vehicle Systems International (AUVSI) estimates the
economic impact of commercial drones will total more than $13.6 billion
within three years of integration into the national airspace system.33
AUVSI further estimates that integration “will create more than 34,000
manufacturing jobs . . . and more than 70,000 new jobs” within the same
time frame.34 Other estimates include an increase in state tax revenues
totaling more than $482 million within the first eleven years following
integration and the creation of 103,776 total jobs by 2025.35 AUVSI
asserts that the United States loses more than $10 billion for every year
that integration is delayed—a total loss of $27.6 million per day.36
AUVSI concludes that “[t]he main inhibitor of U.S. commercial and civil
development of [drones] is the lack of a regulatory structure.”37
B. Regulation of Drones and the FAA Modernization and
Reform Act of 2012
The FAA distinguishes between “public aircraft” and “civil aircraft”
for regulation purposes. A “public aircraft” is (1) an aircraft only used for
governmental purposes, or (2) an aircraft owned or leased by the
government and operated by any persons “for purposes related to crew
training, equipment development, or demonstration.”38 A “civil aircraft”

29. See, e.g., Neal Ungerleider, See What You Can Do with Drone Filmmaking, FAST CO.
(Jan. 31, 2013, 9:00 AM), http://www.fastcocreate.com/1682320/see-what-you-can-do-withdrone-filmmaking.
30. See, e.g., Rapti Gupta, Drones: Aerial Photos the Latest Real Estate Marketing Tool,
REALTY TODAY (May 16, 2014, 4:48 AM), http://www.realtytoday.com/articles/5806/20140516/
drones-aerial-photos-latest-real-estate-marketing-tool.htm.
31. See, e.g., Chris Anderson, Agricultural Drones, MIT TECH. REV. (Apr. 23, 2014),
http://www.technologyreview.com/featuredstory/526491/agricultural-drones/.
32. See Alan Levin, Drone Pilot Fine Test Industry Seen Reaching $89 Billion, BLOOMBERG
BUS. (Oct. 24, 2013, 12:00 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-10-24/drone-pilot-finetests-industry-seen-reaching-89-billion.html.
33. DARRYL JENKINS & BIJAN VASIGH, ASS’N FOR UNMANNED VEHICLE SYS. INT’L, THE
ECONOMIC IMPACT OF UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS INTEGRATION IN THE UNITED STATES 2,
available at https://higherlogicdownload.s3.amazonaws.com/AUVSI/958c920a-7f9b-4ad2-9807
-f9a4e95d1ef1/UploadedImages/New_Economic%20Report%202013%20Full.pdf.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. 14 C.F.R. § 1.1 (2015).
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is anything other than a public aircraft.39 Generally, aircraft used for
commercial purposes qualify as civil aircraft under FAA regulations.40
The distinction between public and civil aircraft is relevant in that the
FAA may not regulate or impose specific safety requirements on aircraft
classified as public.41 Currently, the only way for a civil drone operator
to access the national airspace system is to apply for and obtain an
experimental airworthiness certificate from the FAA.42 Historically, the
FAA has been extremely reluctant to issue airworthiness certificates to
private entities.43 Operating commercial drones at any altitude is
essentially prohibited—prior to September 2014, the FAA certified only
two commercial drone models, both limited to Artic airspace.44
Recognizing that commercial and civil drone use was far outpacing
the FAA’s promulgation of regulations, the federal government enacted
the FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012 (FMRA).45 The
legislation mandates that the FAA develop a plan to safely integrate civil
drones into the national airspace system by September 30, 2015.46 The
plan must include, among other things, “recommendations or
projections . . . on how the rulemaking will define . . . the acceptable
standards for operation and certification of [drones].”47 The FMRA also
requires the establishment of six test ranges for “develop[ing]

39. Id.
40. Id. (defining “commercial purposes” as “the transportation of persons or property for
compensation or hire”).
41. See Testimony—Statement of Nicholas A. Sabatini, Associate Administrator for
Regulation and Certification Before the Comm. on Commerce, Sci. & Transp. on Role of FAA in
Safety Oversight of Forest Service Firefighting Operations, 109th Cong. (2004), available at
http://www.faa.gov/news/testimony/news_story.cfm?newsId=6151&print=go.
42. FAA Fact Sheet, supra note 22.
43. See Michael Berry & Nabiha Syed, The FAA’s Slow Move to Regulate Domestic
Drones, WASH. POST: THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Sept. 24, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.
com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2014/09/24/the-faas-slow-move-to-regulate-domestic-drones/.
44. Busting Myths About the FAA and Unmanned Aircraft, FED. AVIATION ADMIN.,
http://www.faa.gov/news/updates/?newsId=76240 (last updated Mar. 07, 2014). In September
2014, the FAA granted six aerial photography companies exemptions to use drones in a limited
capacity. David Robb, FAA Approves Drone Use for Hollywood Productions, Sets Guidelines—
Update, DEADLINE (Sept. 25, 2014, 1:29 PM), http://deadline.com/2014/09/drones-hollywoodfaa-approves-841265/. The FAA granted exemptions to four more companies the following
December. Alwyn Scott, UPDATE 2-U.S. OK’s More Commercial Drone Use as Congress
Probes Risks, REUTERS (Dec. 10, 2014, 1:31 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/12/10/
usa-drones-faa-idUSL1N0TU0Z820141210.
45. FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-95, 126 Stat. 11 (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 49 U.S.C.).
46. Id. § 332(a)(3).
47. Id. § 332(a)(2).
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certification standards and air traffic requirements for [drones, both civil
and public].”48
However, the legislation notably prohibits the FAA from
“promulgat[ing] any rule or regulation regarding a model aircraft, or an
aircraft being developed as a model aircraft,” provided certain conditions
are met.49 These conditions require that the model aircraft be “flown
strictly for hobby or recreational use,” not weigh over fifty-five pounds,
and not be operated in a manner that interferes with the flight of manned
aircraft.50 The FAA may, however, “pursue enforcement action against
persons operating model aircraft who endanger the safety of the national
airspace system.”51
At the current pace, the FAA is unlikely to meet the 2015 integration
deadline. A 2014 report released by the U.S. Department of
Transportation states that the FAA missed the statutory milestones for
most of the drone-related provisions of the FMRA, including a mandate
to issue a final rule by August 2014 for small drone operations.52
C. The Tumultuous Relationship Between the FAA and
Civil Drone Operators
With the prospects of the FAA implementing a workable regulatory
framework and certification process in the near future looking
increasingly dim, the near-blanket ban on commercial drone use has led
to a high degree of tension between citizen drone
enthusiasts/entrepreneurs and the FAA. The FAA has issued at least
seventeen cease-and-desist letters to drone operators since 2012.53 The
activities targeted in the FAA’s letters include commercial
cinematography, aerial photography, tornado research, inspection of gas
48. Id. § 332(c).
49. Id. § 336(a).
50. Id.
51. Id. § 336(b) (emphasis added). In sum, the FAA may not promulgate rules or regulations
regarding model aircraft but may pursue enforcement actions against model aircraft operated in a
manner that endangers airspace in the public domain. See infra Section IV.B.
52. See Memorandum from Matthew E. Hampton, Assistant Inspector Gen. for Aviation
Audits, U.S. Dep’t of Transp., to Fed. Aviation Admin. (June 26, 2014), in U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP.,
AUDIT REPORT: FAA FACES SIGNIFICANT BARRIERS TO SAFELY INTEGRATE UNMANNED AIRCRAFT
SYSTEMS INTO THE NATIONAL AIRSPACE SYSTEM 2 [hereinafter Hampton Memorandum],
available at https://www.oig.dot.gov/sites/default/files/FAA%20Oversight%20of%20Unmanned
%20Aircraft%20Systems%5E6-26-14.pdf.
53. Matthew Schroyer, FAA Cease and Desist Letters Show Agency’s Attempts to Control
Drone Use in the US, PROF. SOC’Y OF DRONE JOURNALISTS (Feb. 4, 2014), http://www.dronejourn
alism.org/news/2014/2/faa-cease-and-desist-letters-show-agencys-attempts-to-control-drone-use
-in-the-us [hereinafter C&D Letters] (compiling copies of the FAA’s cease and desist letters and
discussing their contents).
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well stacks, and “journalism education[].”54 Though the cease-and-desist
letters detail the means by which a civil operator may obtain authorization
to fly, many of the letters clearly state that the FAA prohibits drones
operated for commercial use.55
In response, some high-end commercial operators are considering
moving their operations to countries with more favorable regulations.56
However, the FAA’s prohibition has done little, if anything, to dissuade
the low-end drone user from continuing to fly. The low barriers to
entering the drone market have promulgated an underground economy
composed of wedding and real estate photographers, rural farmers, and
teenagers—all confident that their limited activities will escape the
FAA’s attention.57
One major (perhaps the major) source of tension arises from the
apparent disagreement that commercial drones—at least those that
qualify under the model aircraft exception—are beyond, or should be
beyond, the FAA’s authority to regulate.58 As a threshold issue to this, it
54. See id.; Jason Koebler, These Are the Companies the FAA Has Harassed for Using
Drones, MOTHERBOARD (Feb. 6, 2014, 3:20 PM), http://motherboard.vice.com/blog/these-arethe-companies-the-faa-has-harassed-for-using-drones.
55. C&D Letters, supra note 53; see also Julianne Chiaet, Drone Pilot Challenges FAA on
Commercial Flying Ban, SCI. AM. (Nov. 1, 2013), http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/
drone-pilot-challenges-faa-commercial-flying-ban/ (“[I]n 2007 the FAA turned its attention to
model airplanes once again. Now termed drones . . ., the agency banned their use for business
purposes.”).
56. See Chad Garland, Drones May Provide Big Lift to Agriculture When FAA Allows Their
Use, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 13, 2014, 5:00 AM), http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-dronesagriculture-20140913-story.html (stating that the FAA’s strict regulations have caused
manufacturers of agricultural drones to market their products overseas); see also Letter from Paul
Misener, Vice President of Global Pub. Policy, Amazon.com, to Michael P. Huerta, Fed. Aviation
Adm’r, 2 (July 9, 2014), available at http://www.statewatch.org/news/2014/jul/usa-amazondelivery-drones.pdf (“Because Amazon is a commercial enterprise we have been limited [by the
current FAA rules] to conducting R&D flights indoors or in other countries. Of course, Amazon
would prefer to keep the focus, jobs, and investment of this important research and development
initiative in the United States by conducting private research and development operations
outdoors near Seattle . . . .”).
57. Some openly defy the FAA. See, e.g., Kevin Robillard, FAA Risks Losing Drone War,
POLITICO (Feb. 22, 2014, 7:02 AM), http://www.politico.com/story/2014/02/federal-aviationadministration-faa-drones-103800_Page2.html (noting that “acts of defiance against the FAA ban
are becoming more blatant”); Jack Nicas & Andy Pasztor, FAA, Drones Clash on Rules for
Unmanned Aircraft, WALL ST. J. (May 11, 2014, 8:43 PM), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/S
B10001424052702303851804579556144292258188 (“Mike Fortin, president of an Orlando,
Fla., drone company that films concerts and TV commercials, received an email from an FAA
official in January telling him that his business was violating FAA policy. ‘My response to the
FAA was to piss off,’ he said. The FAA hasn’t followed up.”).
58. The FAA itself acknowledges this situation. See UAONAS, 72 Fed. Reg. 6689, 6690
(Feb. 13, 2007) (“The FAA recognizes that people and companies other than modelers might be
flying [drones] with the mistaken understanding that they are legally operating under the authority

http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol67/iss6/7

10

Giboney: Don't Ground Me Bro!: Private Ownership of Airspace and How It In

2015]

LOW ALTITUDE COMMERCIAL DRONE OPERATIONS

2159

is unclear exactly what types of drone activities constitute “commercial”
uses. For instance, real estate agents who fly drones to photograph listings
have insisted that because they are not directly charging money for drone
service, they qualify as hobbyists rather than commercial users,59 an
argument that the FAA explicitly rejects.60 The FAA’s extension of its
definition of “commercial” to volunteer nonprofit organizations utilizing
drones for what are clearly noncommercial operations (e.g., search-andrescue missions) has only strained this relationship further.61 Recently,
these issues have moved beyond public debate and into the courtroom.
D. Raphael Pirker Challenges the FAA
Swiss-born Raphael Pirker—famous for his aerial videos of the Statue
of Liberty, the French Alps, and a cruise ship—is a legend among the
drone underground.62 Pirker flies a “Ritewing Zephyr,” a styrofoam
radio-controlled airplane weighing approximately 4.5 pounds and
equipped with a high-definition video camera.63 In 2011, an advertising
company hired Pirker to take aerial photographs and video of the
University of Virginia.64 Two years after uploading video of the flight to
his website,65 the FAA notified Pirker that it was assessing a $10,000 civil
penalty against him for, among other things, allegedly operating his drone
“for compensation” and “in a careless or reckless manner” at altitudes of
less than 400 feet above the University.66 In response, Pirker filed a
motion to dismiss the FAA’s Order of Assessment with the National
Transportation Safety Board (NTSB).67

of AC 91-57. AC 91-57 only applies to modelers, and thus specifically excludes its use by persons
or companies for business purposes.”).
59. Teke Wiggin, FAA Says Realtors Who Fly Drones to Shoot Listing Photos Are Not
Hobbyists, INMAN (June 25, 2014), http://www.inman.com/2014/06/25/faa-says-realtors-who-flydrones-to-shoot-listing-photos-are-not-hobbyists/ (stating that “agents will sometimes say they
are charging for photo or video editing, not drone flights”).
60. Interpretation of the Special Rule for Model Aircraft, 79 Fed. Reg. 36,172, 36,174 (June
25, 2014) (stating that “[a] realtor using a model aircraft to photograph a property that he is trying
to sell and using the photos in the property’s real estate listing” is “[n]ot hobby or recreation”).
61. See, e.g., Jason Koebler, A Search-and-Rescue Group Is Fighting the FAA for the Right
to Use Drones, MOTHERBOARD (Apr. 7, 2014, 1:05 PM), http://motherboard.vice.com/read/asearch-and-rescue-group-is-fighting-the-faa-for-the-right-to-use-drones.
62. See Jason Koebler, Drones Could Be Coming to American Skies Sooner Than You
Think, POLITICO (Jan. 28, 2014), http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2014/01/drones-faalawsuit-coming-to-american-skies-102754.html.
63. Pirker MTD, supra note 10, at 2–3.
64. Id. at 3.
65. See Chiaet, supra note 55.
66. Order of Assessment at 2–3, Huerta v. Pirker, No. CP-217 (N.T.S.B. June 27, 2013)
[hereinafter NTSB Order of Assessment], available at http://www.wired.com/images_blogs/
threatlevel/2014/10/Complaint.pdf.
67. See Pirker MTD, supra note 10.
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Pirker sought dismissal on multiple grounds, including the following:
(1) the FAA may not regulate, and has never attempted to regulate, model
airplanes; (2) the “policy statements” issued by the FAA regarding model
airplanes do not qualify as valid administrative rule making and are
therefore unenforceable; and (3) to the extent the FAA’s policy
statements may be an interpretive rule, an interpretation distinguishing
between drones used for recreational and commercial purposes is
erroneous “and must be rejected.”68
One of Pirker’s specific contentions also threatens to resurrect a
previously unsettled and largely dormant issue and thrust it back into the
limelight:
The FAA also lacks jurisdiction. At a minimum, partial
dismissal of the Complaint is warranted as to all allegations
concerning operation at very low altitudes, inside a tunnel,
below tree top level, or underneath a pedestrian overpass
because these locations are not “navigable airspace”
subject to FAA jurisdiction. See 49 U.S.C. § 40102
(“navigable airspace means airspace above the minimum
altitudes of flight prescribed by regulations . . . including
airspace needed to ensure safety in the takeoff and landing
of aircraft.”).69
In its response to Pirker’s motion, the FAA, though conceding that
Pirker had accurately defined “navigable airspace,” emphatically rejected
the idea that its jurisdiction was so limited.70 Instead, the FAA insisted
that its regulatory authority extends to “the use of all airspace over the
United States by both civil and military aircraft.”71
On March 6, 2014, Administrative Law Judge Patrick G. Geraghty
granted Pirker’s motion, vacated the FAA’s Order of Assessment, and
terminated the proceedings.72 Assuming that Pirker’s radio-controlled
plane was a model aircraft, Judge Geraghty ruled that the FAA’s policy
memoranda are not binding upon the general public, and thus the FAA
68. Id. at 4–13.
69. Id. at 10 (emphasis added).
70. Administrator’s Response to Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss at 4–5, Huerta v. Pirker,
No. CP-217 (N.T.S.B. Nov. 1, 2013) [hereinafter FAA Response], available at
http://www.suasnews.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/11/FAA_Response.pdf.
71. Id. at 5 (quoting United States v. Christenson, 419 F.2d 1401, 1404 (9th Cir. 1969))
(internal quotation marks omitted); see also Busting Myths About the FAA and Unmanned
Aircraft, supra note 44 (“The FAA is responsible for the safety of U.S. airspace from the ground
up. This misperception [that the FAA does not control airspace below 400 feet] may originate
with the idea that manned aircraft generally must stay at least 500 feet above the ground.”).
72. Decisional Order at 8, Huerta v. Pirker, No. CP-217 (N.T.S.B. Mar. 6, 2014)
[hereinafter Pirker Order], available at https://app.ntsb.gov/legal/pirker/Pirker-CP-217.pdf.
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currently lacks the regulatory authority to classify model aircraft as a
drone.73 He further ruled that because the FAA lacks regulatory authority
over model aircraft, Pirker’s operation was subject only to the voluntary
compliance standards of Advisory Circular 91-57.74
The FAA immediately appealed the decision to the full NTSB.
Finding that Pirker’s drone met the statutory definition of “aircraft” and
was, therefore, subject to 14 C.F.R. § 91.13,75 the NTSB reversed Judge
Geraghty’s decision and remanded the case for further proceedings.76
Pirker ultimately settled with the FAA for $1100 in January 2015, “solely
to avoid the expense of litigation.”77
The issue of whether the FAA’s jurisdiction reaches beyond the
confines of navigable airspace has remained relatively dormant for
decades, and neither Judge Geraghty nor the NTSB addressed it. That the
question has remained unaddressed is, presumably, a testament to both
its difficulty and the fact that courts can easily avoid deciding the issue
in a world where commercial air safety generally requires flight at
altitudes higher than 500 feet. But that sky has fallen. In an airspace
densely occupied (potentially) by package delivering quad-copters and
real estate photographers, this issue is of substantial importance.
Although the FAA insists that it “is responsible for the safety of U.S.
airspace from the ground up,”78 critics vehemently maintain that the
FAA’s jurisdiction does not extend to the lower airspace.79 Were a court
to take on the airspace issue, the outcome would have critical
implications. A finding that the FAA has limited or no jurisdiction below
navigable airspace would leave regulation of low-altitude drones almost
totally in the hands of state and local governments—an assuredly less
restrictive outcome and one that, presumably, drone enthusiasts and
entrepreneurs would favor. An opposite finding, however, would likely
ground operations such as Pirker’s for the foreseeable future, at least
73. Id. at 5.
74. Id. at 7. AC 91-57 is an FAA advisory circular, issued in 1981, which “outlines, and
encourages voluntary compliance with, safety standards for model aircraft operators.” U.S. DEP’T
OF TRANSP., FED. AVIATION ADMIN., ADVISORY CIRCULAR 91-57 (1981), available at
http://www.faa.gov/documentLibrary/media/Advisory_Circular/91-57.pdf.
75. This regulation states that “[n]o person may operate an aircraft in a careless or reckless
manner so as to endanger the life or property of another.” 14 C.F.R. § 91.13 (2014).
76. Opinion and Order at 7–11, Huerta v. Pirker, No. CP-217 (N.T.S.B. Nov. 18, 2014)
[hereinafter Pirker Opinion and Order], available at https://app.ntsb.gov/legal/pirker/5730.pdf.
77. Settlement Agreement, Huerta v Pirker, No. CP-217 (N.T.S.B. Jan. 16, 2015), available
at http://cdn.arstechnica.net/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/pirkerdeal.pdf.
78. Busting Myths About the FAA and Unmanned Aircraft, supra note 44.
79. E.g., Peter Sachs, FAA’s Myth Busting Page Now Mirrors Losing Pleadings, DRONERSS (Mar. 9, 2014), http://drone-rss.com/2014/03/faas-myth-busting-page-now-mirrors-losingpleadings/ (arguing that under the FAA’s logic, “the FAA would have jurisdiction if two frisbees
were to collide in a backyard”).
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given the FAA’s actions and stated intentions so far. Though Pirker has
settled his case, it is likely that similar cases will increasingly find their
way into the courtroom and, in time, force the courts to decide the issue
of whether and to what degree the FAA’s jurisdiction extends to nonnavigable airspace.
II. THE FAA’S ARGUMENT FOR DRONE PROHIBITION
In response to the dramatic increase in drone operations “during the
past several years in both the public and private sectors,” the FAA issued
a 2005 policy memorandum to “provide[] guidance . . . to determine if
[drones] may be allowed to conduct flight operations in the U.S. National
Airspace System.”80 Two years later, the FAA published FAA Notice 0701 in the Federal Register stating that “the current FAA policy for [drone]
operations is that no person may operate a [drone] in the National
Airspace System without specific authority.”81 However, “policy
statements of an agency are not . . . binding upon the general public.”82
In Pirker, Judge Geraghty specifically addressed Notice 07-01, stating
that “as a statement of policy, [Notice 07-01] cannot be considered as
establishing a rule or enforceable regulation . . . . [and] does not . . . meet
the criteria for valid legislative rulemaking.”83 As of September 2015, the
FAA has not promulgated any enforceable rules that specifically regulate
drone operations.84 Thus, the FAA’s ability to regulate and prohibit the
use of drones for business purposes must necessarily derive from the
same statutory and regulatory authority that existed prior to the
prohibition.
Congress has declared that “[t]he United States Government has
exclusive sovereignty of airspace of the United States” and that “[a]
80. Memorandum, Fed. Aviation Admin., Unmanned Aircraft Systems Operations in the
U.S. National Airspace System—Interim Operational Approval Guidance (Sept. 16, 2005),
available at http://www.uavm.com/images/AFS-400_05-01_faa_uas_policy.pdf.
81. UAONAS, 72 Fed. Reg. 6689, 6690 (Feb. 13, 2007).
82. Pirker Order, supra note 72, at 1, 5; see also Prof’ls & Patients for Customized Care v.
Shalala, 56 F.3d 592, 596 (5th Cir. 1995) (“A general statement of policy . . . does not establish a
‘binding norm.’ It is not finally determinative of the issues or rights to which it is addressed. The
agency cannot apply or rely upon a general statement of policy as law because a general statement
of policy only announces what the agency seeks to establish as policy.”).
83. Pirker Order, supra note 72, at 6.
84. See Pirker Opinion and Order, supra note 76, at 1, 9 (“The Board has affirmed the
Administrator’s application of § 91.13(a) as an alleged independent violation in other cases in
which, presumably, no other regulation would have explicitly prohibited [Raphael Pirker’s]
conduct.” (emphasis added)); Hampton Memorandum, supra note 52 (stating that the “FAA has
not established a regulatory framework for [drone] integration, such as aircraft certification
requirements, standard air traffic procedures for safely managing [drones] with manned aircraft,
or an adequate controller training program for managing [drones]”).
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citizen of the United States has a public right of transit through the
navigable airspace.”85 Section 40103 tasks the Administrator of the FAA
with developing “plans and policy for the use of the navigable airspace
and assign[ing] by regulation or order the use of the airspace necessary
to ensure the safety of aircraft and the efficient use of airspace.”86 The
Administrator is to “prescribe air traffic regulations . . . for—(A)
navigating, protecting, and identifying aircraft; (B) protecting individuals
and property on the ground; (C) using the navigable airspace efficiently;
and (D) preventing collision between aircraft, between aircraft and land
or water vehicles, and between aircraft and airborne objects.”87
“Aircraft” is defined in 49 U.S.C. § 40102 as “any contrivance
invented, used, or designed to navigate, or fly in, the air.”88 Also relevant
is 14 CFR § 91.13, which states that “[n]o person may operate an aircraft
in a careless or reckless manner so as to endanger the life or property of
another.”89 Aside from § 91.13 of the Code of Federal Regulations, the
FAA rarely cites to any specific statute or regulation authorizing the
grounding of drones used for commercial purposes.90 Nevertheless, one
can deduce how the FAA interprets its statutory and regulatory authority
as applying to drones by examining the numerous cease-and-desist letters
issued by the FAA, as well as the arguments it raises in the Pirker dispute.
Many of the FAA’s cease-and-desist letters state that “[t]he FAA has
the requirement for the regulation and safe operation of the National
Airspace System which covers all navigable airspace in the US.”91
“Navigable airspace” is defined in 49 U.S.C. § 40102 as the “airspace
above the minimum altitudes of flight prescribed by regulations under this
subpart and subpart III of this part, including airspace needed to ensure
safety in the takeoff and landing of aircraft.”92 Minimum altitudes of
flight are described as, generally, 1000 feet above the highest obstacle
over congested areas and 500 feet above the surface over non-congested
areas, except when necessary for taking off and landing.93
Thus, the FAA’s above statement, on its own, would suggest that the
FAA’s mandate does not extend to drone operations, such as Pirker’s,
flying below navigable airspace. Three of the cease-and-desist letters,
however, further state that “[p]rivate land owners do not have any
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

49 U.S.C. § 40103(a)(2) (2012).
Id. § 40103(b)(1).
Id. § 40103(b)(2).
Id. § 40102(a)(6).
14 C.F.R. § 91.13(a) (2015).
See infra Section IV.C.
C&D Letters, supra note 53 (emphasis added).
49 U.S.C. § 40102(a)(32) (2012) (emphasis added).
14 C.F.R. § 91.119(b)–(c) (2015).
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jurisdiction over the airspace above their property and cannot prohibit or
allow aviation operations over their land.”94 This statement implies that
the FAA interprets its mandate as extending to the safe operation and
regulation of not just navigable airspace but all airspace—an
interpretation expressly confirmed by the FAA.95
In response to Pirker’s contention that the FAA “lacks
jurisdiction . . . at very low altitudes . . . because these locations are not
‘navigable airspace’ subject to FAA jurisdiction,”96 the FAA stated:
The Respondent accurately cites the definition of “navigable
airspace;” however, that definition does not in any way,
explicitly or implicitly, define the outer limits of the FAA’s
authority to regulate airspace. In sum, the FAA’s mandate to
regulate the use of all airspace necessary to “ensure the
safety” of aircraft, for “protecting, and identifying” those
aircraft, and for “protecting individuals on the ground” is not
confined solely to the “navigable airspace.”97
The quoted language in the second sentence of the FAA’s statement
derives from 49 U.S.C. § 40103(b)(2)(A)–(D). However, in insisting that
the outer limits of its authority are not limited by definition of navigable
airspace, the FAA is actually interpreting 49 U.S.C. § 40103(b)(1), which
states:
The Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration
shall develop plans and policy for the use of the navigable
airspace and assign by regulation or order the use of the
airspace necessary to ensure the safety of aircraft and the
efficient use of airspace. The Administrator may modify or
revoke an assignment when required in the public interest.98
Thus, in insisting that it “is responsible for the safety of U.S. airspace
from the ground up,”99 the FAA clearly reads “use of the airspace
necessary” as having meaning independent of “for the use of navigable
airspace.” Stated differently, the FAA has interpreted § 40103(b)(1) as a
dual mandate: the FAA must develop plans and policies for the use of
navigable airspace as well as ensure the safety of all airspace (and
aircraft), regardless of altitude.
Does § 40103 authorize the FAA to regulate the safety of all airspace
rather than just that in the public domain? To justify a blanket prohibition
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

C&D Letters, supra note 53.
Busting Myths About the FAA and Unmanned Aircraft, supra note 44.
Pirker MTD, supra note 10, at 10.
FAA Response, supra note 70, at 5.
49 U.S.C. § 40103(b)(1) (2012).
Busting Myths About the FAA and Unmanned Aircraft, supra note 44.
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on the use of drones for business purposes, flying safely below navigable
airspace, requires the FAA to answer that question in the affirmative.100
If, however, the answer to that question is no, then it is highly unlikely
that the FAA has any authority to ground low-altitude drone operations
such as Pirker’s. Answering this critical question requires examining
previous airspace disputes between the federal government and property
owners.
III. LANDOWNERS’ RIGHTS TO “SUPERADJACENT” AIRSPACE AND
HOW IT LIMITS THE FAA’S JURISDICTION
Prior to the advent of aviation, the predominant theory of airspace
property rights were expressed in the Roman Law maxim cujus est solum,
ejus est usque ad coelom (commonly translated as “whoever has the land
possesses all the space upwards to an indefinite extent”).101 The rule,
incorporated into the English common law system with the support of Sir
Edward Coke and Lord William Blackstone, would eventually make its
way across the Atlantic and firmly establish itself in the United States.102
This all changed, however, on December 17, 1903, when “two daring
American brothers near Kitty Hawk, North Carolina sparked a
technological revolution that would soon bring Lord Coke’s wellreasoned doctrine crashing in upon itself.”103
With the rapid expansion of civil aviation leading up to and following
World War II, the traditional legal framework proved wholly inadequate
in addressing the onslaught of airspace trespass and nuisance cases.104
The legal challenge was twofold: granting absolute airspace rights to
property owners would threaten to stifle a young and flourishing form of
commerce, while “allow[ing] every low-flying barnstormer to terrorize
rural communities with no consequence seemed an equally bad
alternative.”105
Believing that the young, but burgeoning, airplane industry “could not
reach its full commercial potential without federal action,” Congress
passed the Air Commerce Act in 1926.106 The legislation charged the
Secretary of Commerce with, among other things, fostering air commerce

100. See infra Part IV.
101. Colin Cahoon, Comment, Low Altitude Airspace: A Property Rights No-Man’s Land,
56 J. AIR L. & COM. 157, 161 (1990).
102. Id. at 161–62.
103. Id. at 162.
104. Id. at 162–63.
105. Id. at 163.
AVIATION
ADMIN.,
106. See
A
Brief
History
of
the
FAA,
FED.
https://www.faa.gov/about/history/brief_history/ (last updated Feb. 19, 2015, 4:23 PM).
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and improving and maintaining safety standards.107 This law included a
provision stating that “Congress hereby declares that the Government of
the United States has, to the exclusion of all foreign nations, complete
sovereignty of the airspace over the lands and waters of the United
States.”108 The Air Commerce Act, however, applied only to interstate
flights and further complicated the “aerial trespass question.”109
Under federal law, planes had to be at least five hundred or
one thousand feet above the ground, but under state law there
was no guarantee that they could be above the ground at all.
Everything depended on the law of the particular state. And
to make matters even stranger, in the first reported case
testing the constitutionality of the Air Commerce Act, a
federal judge suggested that the minimum altitude
requirements might not be lawfully applied to intrastate
flights in the first place.110
The Aeronautics Branch, previously tasked with aviation oversight,
was renamed the Bureau of Air Commerce in 1934.111 However, at this
point, the Bureau had no radio link with aircraft, and local governments
continued to operate airport towers.112 The public outcry in response to a
number of high-profile plane accidents113 prompted President Franklin D.
Roosevelt to sign the Civil Aeronautics Act in 1938.114
The Act established the Civil Aeronautics Authority (CAA) and
expanded the federal government’s role in aviation by granting the CAA
the power to regulate airline fares and routes.115 The Act—in the wake of
prior Supreme Court decisions substantially broadening Congress’s
power to regulate interstate commerce (as well as “five
cases . . . conclud[ing] that flights at high altitudes were not
trespasses”)—also did away with the intrastate/interstate distinction and
declared a “public right of freedom of transit . . . through the navigable
air space” for all flights.116 While the Act definitively settled who
107. Air Commerce Act of 1926, Pub. L. No. 69-254, 44 Stat. 568.
108. Id. (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C. § 40103 (2012)).
109. STUART BANNER, WHO OWNS THE SKY?: THE STRUGGLE TO CONTROL AIRSPACE FROM
THE WRIGHT BROTHERS ON 167 (2008).
110. Id.
111. A Brief History of the FAA, supra note 106.
112. Id.
113. One such accident involved football legend Knute Rockne. See Herbert M. Friedman &
Ada Kera Friedman, The Legacy of the Rockne Crash, AEROPLANE MAG. (May 2001), available
at http://www.irishlegends.com/pages/reflections/reflections49.html.
114. A Brief History of the FAA, supra note 106.
115. Id.
116. See BANNER, supra note 109, at 199 (quoting Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, Pub. L.
No. 75-706, 52 Stat. 973).
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controlled the airspace at higher altitudes, exactly who controlled the
airspace below the public domain remained an open question.117
A. Establishing the Landowner’s Right to Own
“Superadjacent” Airspace
Thomas Causby owned and maintained a chicken farm on 2.8 acres of
land near an airport outside of Greensboro, North Carolina.118 The federal
government leased the airport in 1942.119 Before long, four-motored
bombers and other heavy planes were frequently passing over the
Causbys’ property “in considerable numbers and rather close
together.”120 The approved glide path of the airport’s northwest–
southeast runway passed directly over the Causbys’ farm at extremely
low altitudes.121
The noise proved to be too much for the Causbys’ chickens, which
Causby stated “[would] get excited and jump against the side of the
chicken house and the walls and burst themselves open and die.”122
Losing their chicken business (and perhaps their sanity) as a result, the
Causbys filed suit against the U.S. government.123 The Supreme Court
granted certiorari, noting that the issue was one of first impression as well
as noting its importance.124
The government argued that since the military flights were within the
minimum safe altitudes of flight as prescribed by the CAA and because
there had been no physical invasion of the Causbys’ property, there had
been no compensable Fifth Amendment taking.125 The government’s
primary argument, however, was that the Causbys did not “own [the]
superadjacent airspace which [they have] not subjected to possession by
the erection of structures or other occupancy,” and hence the Causbys
possessed no property that the government could have taken.126

117. Id. at 199–200.
118. United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 258 (1946).
119. Id.
120. Id. at 259.
121. Id. at 258–59 (stating that the aircrafts “come close enough at times to appear barely to
miss the tops of the trees and at times so close to the tops of the trees as to blow the old leaves
off”).
122. BANNER, supra note 109, at 229 (stating that Thomas Causby purportedly lost 150
chickens in this manner).
123. Causby v. United States, 60 F. Supp. 751 (Ct. Cl. 1945), rev’d, 328 U.S. 256 (1946).
124. Causby, 328 U.S. at 258.
125. Id. at 260.
126. Id.; BANNER, supra note 109, at 242.
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Justice William O. Douglas, writing for the Court, addressed the latter
argument first, declaring that cujus est solum, ejus est usque ad coelom
“has no place in the modern world.”127 He reasoned:
The air is a public highway, as Congress has declared. Were
that not true, every transcontinental flight would subject the
operator to countless trespass suits. Common sense revolts
at the idea. To recognize such private claims to the airspace
would clog these highways, seriously interfere with their
control and development in the public interest, and transfer
into private ownership that to which only the public has a
just claim.128
However, Justice Douglas then stated that the above principle would
not control the Causbys’ case.129 Framing the issue as a loss of land rather
than airspace, Justice Douglas rejected the government’s contention that
a landowner had no proprietary interest in the airspace above his
property.130 He stated:
We have said that the airspace is a public highway. Yet it is
obvious that if the landowner is to have full enjoyment of the
land, he must have exclusive control of the immediate
reaches of the enveloping atmosphere. Otherwise buildings
could not be erected, trees could not be planted, and even
fences could not be run. . . . The landowner owns at least as
much of the space above the ground as he can occupy or use
in connection with the land.131
Further, Justice Douglas reasoned that a landowner’s failure to
physically occupy the airspace above his property is immaterial, stating
that “[a]s we have said, the flight of airplanes, which skim the surface but
do not touch it, is as much an appropriation of the use of the land as a
more conventional entry upon it.”132 He continued, “While the owner
does not in any physical manner occupy that stratum of airspace or make
use of it in the conventional sense, he does use it in somewhat the same
sense that space left between buildings for the purpose of light and air is
used.”133 Justice Douglas concluded, “We think that the landowner, as an
incident to his ownership, has a claim to it and that invasions of it are in
the same category as invasions of the surface.”134
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.

Causby, 328 U.S. at 260–61.
Id. at 261.
Id.
BANNER, supra note 109, at 252.
Causby, 328 U.S. at 264.
Id.
Id. at 265.
Id.
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Justice Douglas’s holding in Causby firmly established that the
landowner retains ownership of at least some of the airspace above her
property. But how much? “[A]s much of the space above the ground as
he can occupy or use in connection with the land.”135 On the other hand,
the Court expressly stated that a landowner may not convert into private
ownership airspace within the public domain.136 This raised another
question: At what point does public ownership of the airspace begin and
private ownership end? The Court addressed the former without
addressing the latter.137
In his holding, Justice Douglas notably equated airspace in the public
domain with navigable airspace stating that “[t]he navigable airspace
which Congress has placed in the public domain is ‘airspace above the
minimum safe altitudes of flight prescribed by the Civil Aeronautics
Authority.’”138 When the Court decided Causby, the minimum safe
altitude prescribed by the CAA was 500 feet during the day and 1000 feet
at night.139 Because the aircraft flying over the Causbys’ farm were below
navigable airspace, Justice Douglas reasoned that “the flights in question
were not within the navigable airspace which Congress placed within the
public domain.”140 Thus, Thomas Causby had a valid claim.
Noting that the CAA has “the power to prescribe air traffic rules,”141
the Court appears to suggest that redefining minimum safe altitudes of
flight might avoid claims such as Causby’s. Justice Douglas anticipated
the issue but did not address it, stating only that if the CAA “prescribed
83 feet as the minimum safe altitude, then we would have presented the
question of the validity of the regulation.”142
Causby establishes two crucial points in determining the extent of the
FAA’s authority: (1) a private landowner owns as much of the airspace,
below the airspace Congress has placed within the public domain, “as
[he] can occupy or use in connection with the land”; and (2) the minimum
altitudes of flight, as defined by Congress, determine the outer limits of
airspace owned by the public.143 However, an important question
remained: though it is clear that public airspace may not be incorporated
into private ownership, is the converse also true? May privately owned
135. Id. at 264.
136. Id. at 261.
137. Id. at 266 (stating that “[t]he airspace, apart from the immediate reaches above the land,
is part of the public domain. We need not determine at this time what those precise limits are”).
138. Id. at 263 (quoting 49 U.S.C. § 180).
139. Id.
140. Id. at 264.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 263. Eighty-three feet was the approximate altitude of the military aircraft flying
over Thomas Causby’s farm. Id. at 258.
143. Id. at 264.
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airspace be incorporated into the public domain without invading a
private property interest by merely revising the definition of “navigable
airspace,” i.e., by lowering the “minimum safe altitudes of flight”?144
When the Court decided Causby, the airspace required for taking off
or landing was not “within the navigable airspace which Congress placed
within the public domain.”145 Had that airspace been included, the Court
noted, the government would have been immune from Causby’s claim.146
Largely in response to the shift in the nature and targets of airspace
lawsuits resulting from the Causby decision, Congress redefined
navigable airspace to include “airspace needed to insure safety in takeoff and landing of aircraft.”147
Now, there is no question that the glide paths above the Causbys’
property were within navigable airspace. Could the affected landowner
still sustain a Causby-type claim now that planes were taking off and
landing in statutorily defined public airspace? Stated differently, if planes
were flying in airspace Congress had formally dedicated to the public,
how could the affected landowner claim that his rights to his airspace had
been violated? Interestingly, Justice Douglas would answer this question,
hinted at by himself in Causby, sixteen years later in Griggs v. Alleghany
County.148
The facts in Griggs are markedly similar to those in Causby. In
Griggs, planes taking off from a nearby airport’s newly constructed
runway “observed regular flight patterns ranging from 30 feet to 300 feet
over [Thomas Griggs’s] residence.”149 Griggs alleged that the low-flying
aircraft made it impossible for people to “converse or to talk on the
telephone” and that they were “frequently unable to sleep even with ear
plugs and sleeping pills.”150
In a short opinion, Justice Douglas held that, despite the fact that the
aircraft were operating in accordance with federal regulations and flying
within navigable airspace, a taking had occurred.151 Relying on his prior
decision in Causby, Justice Douglas stated:
144. 49 U.S.C. § 180 (2012).
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. BANNER, supra note 109, at 259 (“Landowners had once sued pilots and airplane owners
for trespass and nuisance; now, more often than not, they sued government-owned airports for
violations of the Takings Clause or its state constitutional analogues. In the 1950s, as they
acquired jet engines, planes grew larger and louder, and they needed longer and shallower glide
paths on takeoff and landing. Meanwhile the volume of air traffic continued to increase, so there
was never any shortage of aggrieved landowners near airports . . . .”).
148. 369 U.S. 84 (1962).
149. Id. at 87.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 88–89.
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[T]he use of land presupposes the use of some of the airspace
above it. Otherwise no home could be built, no tree planted,
no fence constructed, no chimney erected. An invasion of the
“superadjacent airspace” will often “affect the use of the
surface of the land itself.”152
Justice Douglas concluded, “[Alleghany County] in designing [the
airport and glide path] had to acquire some private property. Our
conclusion is that by constitutional standards it did not acquire
enough.”153
B. The FAA’s “Ground Up” Argument Cannot Be Reconciled with
Griggs and Causby
The essential holdings of both cases clearly establish that landowners
own the immediate airspace above their land. The holdings’ continued
survival decisively undercuts the FAA’s assertion that it “is responsible
for the safety of U.S. airspace from the ground up.”154 First, if “[t]he
landowner owns at least as much of the space above the ground as [he]
can occupy or use in connection with the land,”155 then the privately
owned airspace by definition is not “U.S. airspace.” Second, presuming
that a landowner does in fact own at least some airspace above his
property, then “U.S. airspace,” at least above the landowner’s property,
does not extend “from the ground up.” Third, the “ground up” argument
would suggest that the FAA retains regulatory authority over a decidedly
absurd amount of private property and, by extension, all undertakings
conducted in the airspace above that property. In sum, accepting the
“ground up” argument requires inferring that Congress intended the
FAA’s jurisdiction to extend to an errant firework launched into the air
above a neighbor’s property, smoke from controlled burnings,
parasailing, or even “two frisbees . . . collid[ing] in a backyard.”156
Clearly then the obvious absurdities inherent in the FAA’s “ground up”
argument cannot be reconciled with the Supreme Court’s decisions in
Causby and Griggs.
Likewise, the same reasoning defeats the related argument that
“[p]rivate land owners do not have any jurisdiction over the airspace
above their property and cannot prohibit or allow aviation operations over
their land.”157 The landowner’s ownership of the airspace used in
connection with the land carries with it an implicit right to exclude
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.

Id. at 89 (citation omitted).
Id. at 90.
Busting Myths About the FAA and Unmanned Aircraft, supra note 44.
United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 264 (1946).
Sachs, supra note 79.
C&D Letters, supra note 53.
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others—a right the Supreme Court has repeatedly characterized as “one
of the most essential sticks in the bundle of rights that are commonly
characterized as property.”158 Thus, while a landowner cannot prohibit or
allow aviation operations conducted in public airspace, a landowner,
incident to his ownership may, at the very least, exclude aviation
operations conducted in his privately owned airspace. Any assertion to
the contrary would suggest that had Pirker conducted his operation
without the consent of the University of Virginia, any attempt by the
University to remove Pirker’s aircraft from their airspace without
consulting the FAA would be an exercise of authority that the University
does not possess. Thus, landowners must, contrary to the FAA’s
assertion, possess at least some “jurisdiction over the airspace above their
property.”159
The FAA’s justification for its moratorium on flying drones for
business purposes, at least those flying in privately owned airspace, must
rest on alternative grounds.
C. Flower Mills and the FAA’s “All Airspace Necessary” Argument
The FAA’s better argument is the more limited one it advanced in the
Pirker case: “[T]he FAA’s mandate to regulate the use of all airspace
necessary to ‘ensure the safety’ of aircraft, for ‘protecting, and
identifying’ those aircraft, and for ‘protecting individuals on the
ground,’” and this “is not confined solely to the ‘navigable airspace.’”160
This interpretation is narrower than those discussed previously in that it
suggests that the FAA is responsible for the safety of all aircraft rather
than airspace, and hence it may regulate the use of “all airspace
necessary” to (1) protect aircraft and (2) protect “individuals on the
ground” from those aircraft.
But this interpretation, though lacking the absurdities inherent in the
arguments already discussed, is overbroad. If the FAA may regulate the
use of all airspace necessary to protect aircraft, then the FAA should
possess regulatory authority over building heights and all manner of
vertical construction and undertakings. Stated differently, under this
interpretation, the FAA should be able to halt proposed construction
projects that it determines would endanger the safety of aircraft. The U.S.
Claims Court took up this issue in Flower Mills Associates v. United
States.161
158. Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979); see, e.g., Dolan v. City of
Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 384 (1994) (quoting Kaiser Aetna); Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S.
1003, 1044 (1992) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (same); Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S.
825, 831 (1987) (same).
159. C&D Letters, supra note 53.
160. FAA Response, supra note 70, at 5.
161. 23 Cl. Ct. 182 (1991).
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In Flower Mills, the plaintiff sought to construct a warehouse building
on its property that would be 700 feet from the end of a runway of a
privately owned airport.162 To build the structure, the plaintiff required
the approval of the Pennsylvania Department of Transportation, which
agreed to grant the construction permit if the FAA first determined that
“the proposed building would not be a hazard to air navigation.”163 The
FAA, after reviewing the plaintiff’s proposed structure, decided
“that . . . the proposed structure would have a substantially adverse effect
on the safe and efficient use of airspace by aircraft.”164 The plaintiff
brought an action against the FAA, alleging that the FAA’s decision
amounted to an uncompensated regulatory taking prohibited under the
Fifth Amendment.165
The court stated that the issue was one of first impression but noted
that other courts had reviewed prior safety determinations made by the
FAA outside of the context of regulatory takings.166 Citing Aircraft
Owners & Pilots Ass’n v. FAA,167 the court stated, “Once issued, a
[safety] determination has no enforceable legal effect. The FAA is not
empowered to prohibit or limit proposed construction it deems dangerous
to air navigation.”168 Because compliance with the FAA’s hazard
determination was voluntary, the court reasoned that the government had
not deprived the plaintiff of any property rights, and hence no regulatory
taking had occurred.169
Flower Mills shows that the FAA, contrary to its claim, lacks the
authority to regulate the use of “all airspace necessary,” even where a
landowner’s use of airspace above his property is dangerous to air
navigation—at least where that airspace is used for purposes of
construction. Taken together with the decisions in Causby and Griggs, it
is clear that the FAA’s jurisdiction over the airspace is not nearly as broad
as the FAA would suggest. Defining the precise limits of that authority,
however, presents a more difficult question. In attempting to derive an
answer, the most logical place to start must necessarily be where the
FAA’s regulatory authority is at its minimum: the “superadjacent”
airspace above a landowner’s property.

162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.

Id. at 183–84.
Id. at 185.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 186.
600 F.2d 965 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
Flower Mills, 23 Cl. Ct. at 186 (emphasis added).
Id. at 188–89.
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D. The Limits of “Superadjacent” Airspace
Does a landowner’s superadjacent airspace extend to the boundaries
of navigable airspace?170 Or does a zone of unclaimed airspace exist
between navigable airspace and superadjacent airspace? Justice Douglas
left this ambiguity unaddressed in both Causby and Griggs. Despite
holding that a landowner has a property interest in the superadjacent
airspace above his land,171 Justice Douglas declined to provide a precise
definition of the term. Though the Supreme Court continues to recognize
a distinction between navigable airspace and privately owned airspace,172
it has never resolved this ambiguity.173 Interestingly, modern
technology—specifically, drones and the manner in which the public uses
them—may provide an answer, rather than the courts.
“The landowner owns at least as much of the space above the ground
as he can occupy or use in connection with the land.”174 While it may
have been difficult for a run-of-the-mill landowner to use or occupy the
airspace 200 feet or more above his land in 1962 (the year the Court
decided Griggs), drone technology’s affordability provides landowners a
means to access what was once virtually inaccessible. Further, the
modern capabilities of drone technology allow landowners to use these
higher altitudes not merely for recreational use but “in connection with
the land.”
For instance, the university that hires a commercial drone operator to
acquire aerial photographs and footage for advertising its campus can
reasonably be said to be using the airspace above the ground “in
connection with the land.” Other examples include the above-mentioned
real estate owners, boar hunters, and farmers.175 Any landowner using
170. At least one state supreme court has held that it does. See McCarran Int’l Airport v.
Sisolak, 137 P.3d 1110, 1119 (Nev. 2006) (holding that airspace below the required minimum
altitudes for flight “is vested in the owner of the subjacent land”).
171. United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 265 (1946).
172. See, e.g., Air Pegasus of D.C., Inc. v. United States, 424 F.3d 1206, 1217 (Fed. Cir.
2005).
173. This is probably because resolving the ambiguity proved unnecessary. See BANNER,
supra note 109, at 259–60 (“Many of the uncertainties surrounding aerial trespass in the years
after Causby were eventually ironed out, after enough cases presenting slightly different fact
situations had made their way through the lower courts. As the law coalesced, landowners in
practice had to prove they had suffered some harm on the ground in order to prevail. . . . The
resulting legal standard thus ended up being very close to the formulation of the Restatement of
Torts from the early 1930s, in that by requiring harm and low overflights as prerequisites it
effectively merged the law of nuisance . . . with the law of trespass to land . . . . As the law grew
clearer, reported cases raising the issue became less common, as airports acquired enough
neighboring parcels to forestall litigation[,] . . . the aerial trespass debate largely fizzled out.”).
174. Causby, 328 U.S. at 264.
175. See supra notes 4, 30–31 and accompanying text.
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drones to further an undertaking “in connection with the land,” in
accordance with Justice Douglas’s reasoning in Causby, converts the
previously unclaimed airspace into private ownership.
Hence, for the landowner utilizing drones above his property, the
superadjacent airspace is limited only by the bounds of navigable
airspace. The FAA’s prohibition on a landowner utilizing drones above
his land for business purposes therefore amounts to a denial of the
landowner’s property interest—his right to “own[] at least as much of the
space above the ground as [he] can occupy or use in connection with the
land.”176 For reasons previously discussed, this invasion of private
property cannot be justified on the “ground up” theory or the “land
owners do not have any jurisdiction over the airspace” theory.177 Nor can
it be justified purely on a determination that use of the airspace on its own
presents a danger to air navigation.178
Thus, resolution of the superadjacent airspace question suggests two
limiting factors on the FAA’s jurisdiction over private airspace: (1) its
mandate to ensure the safety and efficiency of airspace in the public
domain (navigable airspace) and (2) its authority to regulate aircraft.
IV. THE FAA’S BLANKET PROHIBITION ON DRONES OPERATED
FOR “BUSINESS PURPOSES” IS AN INVALID (AND UNJUSTIFIED)
EXERCISE OF ITS (CURRENT) AUTHORITY
What justifications have the FAA advanced for prohibiting the use of
drones at any altitude for business purposes? The core justification,
gleaned from the language in the cease-and-desist letters, appears to be
that persons operating drones for business purposes are unable to comply
with Title 14 of the Code of Federal Regulations.179 They are unable to
comply because “most wishing to operate [drones] are not pilot trained,
certified, or familiar with the Code of Federal Regulations to ensure the
safety of others.”180 However, there is currently no process to train or
certify an operator to use commercial drones at any altitude.181
In other words, operators of commercial drones are “unable to
comply” with regulations because there are no regulations to comply
with. Yet, provided they refrain from endangering “the safety of the
176. Causby, 328 U.S. at 264.
177. See supra Section III.B.
178. See supra Section III.C.
179. C&D Letters, supra note 53.
180. Id.
181. The only way to do so is to seek a waiver exempting the operator from the regulations.
See Petitioning for Exemption Under Section 333, FED. AVIATION ADMIN.,
http://www.faa.gov/uas/legislative_programs/section_333/how_to_file_a_petition/ (last updated
Mar. 13, 2015, 1:52 PM).
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national airspace system,”182 persons using drones for recreational use are
largely beyond—in some cases completely beyond183—the FAA’s
regulatory authority. Such persons are also not, in general, “pilot trained,
certified, or familiar with the Code of Federal Regulations.”184 Hence, the
justification for the prohibition inheres in the nature of the use, not the
machine itself.
That drones operated for business purposes may, in theory, present a
greater safety risk than when operated recreationally is certainly not
unreasonable. But the enforcement of a blanket prohibition first requires
the authority to impose it. Because (1) the scope of the FAA’s authority
is limited, and (2) the prohibition is based on the manner (i.e., business
purposes) in which the operator uses the drone, it is unlikely that the FAA
retains the authority to maintain the prohibition.
A. Reconciling the FAA’s Regulatory Authority with the Right to
Privately Own Airspace
The landowner’s right to own the airspace above his land cannot be
reconciled with the FAA’s dual-mandate interpretation discussed
above,185 as the FAA does not possess the blanket authority to the “use
of all airspace necessary to ‘ensure the safety’ of aircraft.”186 However,
resolution of the superadjacent airspace question suggests two possible
interpretations for reconciling the airspace rights of the landowner with
the FAA’s mandate to ensure the safety and efficiency of airspace.
The first and narrower interpretation is that the FAA’s jurisdiction
over the airspace itself is limited to navigable airspace but extends to all
aircraft, regardless of altitude, designed or operated in a manner that
presents a risk to the safety and efficiency of navigable airspace.187 Put
differently, the landowner would retain the right to own the superadjacent
airspace above his land, but the FAA would retain the authority to prevent
the landowner from utilizing aircraft designed or operated in a manner
that threatens the integrity of airspace within the public domain. Of
course, under this interpretation, maintaining the moratorium on drones
flown below navigable airspace utilized for business purposes requires
the FAA to persuasively argue that the nature of the use, rather than the
182. FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-95, § 336(b), 126 Stat.
11, 77.
183. See infra Section IV.B.
184. C&D Letters, supra note 53.
185. See supra Part II.
186. FAA Response, supra note 70, at 5; see also supra Section III.C.
187. This interpretation accords with the interpretation advanced by Pirker’s attorney. See
Pirker MTD, supra note 10, at 10; see also infra Section IV.D (discussing the safety risks of
drones occupying navigable airspace).
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physical characteristics or the manner in which these aircraft are
operated, endangers or otherwise affects the safety and efficiency of
navigable airspace.188
The second and broader interpretation encapsulates the first but
extends the FAA’s jurisdiction to any aircraft occupying any airspace,
provided those aircraft are operated in a careless or reckless manner.
This interpretation accords with the NTSB’s decision on appeal189 and
would allow the FAA to pursue an enforcement action against any aircraft
operated “in a careless or reckless manner,” regardless of whether that
operation presents a danger to navigable airspace.190 Here too, the
landowner would retain his airspace rights but would be prevented from
utilizing aircraft in a manner that could potentially “endanger the life or
property of another.” But even here the FAA would find difficulty in
maintaining its blanket prohibition. The FAA would have to persuasively
argue either (1) that the operation of any drone aircraft for any
commercial purpose constitutes negligence or (2) that the current lack of
regulations precludes any commercial operator from flying in a less than
negligent manner.191
In any case, both approaches accord with Supreme Court rulings on
the issue of private airspace ownership. Because the broader
interpretation accords with the NTSB’s reversal of Judge Geraghty’s
decision, the remainder of this Part examines whether the prohibition on
drones used for business purposes can survive under that interpretation.
B. Argument by Analogy: The FMRA’s Special Rule for
Model Aircraft
Under the FMRA’s Special Rule for Model Aircraft, Section 336, the
FAA is expressly forbidden from “promulgat[ing] any rule or regulation
regarding a model aircraft,” provided certain conditions are met.192 The
188. The FAA has yet to demonstrate that the machines themselves present such a danger,
much less those used for “business purposes.” See Hampton Memorandum, supra note 52, at 2
(stating that the “FAA is not effectively collecting and analyzing UAS safety data to identify
risks”); see also infra Section IV.D (noting a study on the safety impact of drones in the airspace).
189. See infra Section IV.C.
190. 14 C.F.R. § 91.13 (2014).
191. See infra Section IV.B.
192. FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-95, § 336(a), 126 Stat.
11, 77. The FAA may not regulate a model aircraft if:
(1) the aircraft is flown strictly for hobby or recreational use; (2) the aircraft is
operated in accordance with a community-based set of safety guidelines and
within the programming of a nationwide community-based organization; (3) the
aircraft is limited to not more than 55 pounds unless otherwise certified through
a design, construction, inspection, flight test, and operational safety program
administered by a community-based organization; (4) the aircraft is operated in
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FMRA defines “model aircraft” as an “unmanned aircraft that is—(1)
capable of sustained flight in the atmosphere; (2) flown within visual line
of sight of the person operating the aircraft; and (3) flown for hobby or
recreational purposes.”193 Most important, however, is the following
language included in the same section: “Nothing in this section shall be
construed to limit the authority of the Administrator to pursue
enforcement action against persons operating model aircraft who
endanger the safety of the national airspace system.”194
By implication, the language makes clear that a drone operating
within the statutory parameters just discussed does not endanger the
safety of the national airspace system, or any airspace, without some
further negligent act on the part of the operator. It stands to reason then
that operating a drone in accordance with all the requirements of
Section 336 save one—flying for business purposes instead of
recreation—does not endanger the safety of the national airspace system,
or any airspace. Thus, unless the FAA intends to argue that safety inheres
purely in whether money changes hands,195 operating a drone that would
otherwise qualify as a model aircraft (e.g., Pirker’s glider) does not,
without more, endanger the airspace or the public. Stated differently, the
operation of any drone aircraft for any commercial purpose does not
necessarily constitute negligence. Operating such a drone in a less than
negligent manner would therefore not bring the operator within the
purview of the FAA’s jurisdiction, regardless of whether the drone is
operated for business purposes. The FAA appears to concede this
conclusion in the enforcement action levied against Pirker.
C. The FAA Implicitly Concedes that the Prohibition Is Invalid
In its complaint, the FAA charged Pirker only with violating 14 C.F.R.
§ 91.13 by “operat[ing his aircraft] in a careless or reckless manner so as
to endanger the life or property of another.”196 The commercial nature of
a manner that does not interfere with and gives way to any manned aircraft; and
(5) when flown within 5 miles of an airport, the operator of the aircraft provides
the airport operator and the airport air traffic control tower (when an air traffic
facility is located at the airport) with prior notice of the operation (model aircraft
operators flying from a permanent location within 5 miles of an airport should
establish a mutually-agreed upon operating procedure with the airport operator
and the airport air traffic control tower (when an air traffic facility is located at
the airport)).
Id.
193.
194.
195.
IV.C.
196.

Id. § 336(c).
Id. § 336(b).
This is an argument the FAA appears to deliberately avoid making. See infra Section
NTSB Order of Assessment, supra note 66, at 2.
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the flight is only referenced in paragraphs five and six of the assessment,
presumably to demonstrate that the Special Rule for Model Aircraft does
not protect Pirker.197 The “for compensation” language does not appear
in paragraph nine, where the FAA specifically alleged what actions taken
by Pirker constitute operating the aircraft in a careless or unsafe
manner.198 That it refrains from doing so suggests that the FAA is not
convinced that the $10,000 fine can rest on a claim that Pirker operated
his drone “for compensation.” This accords with the NTSB’s decision to
remand Pirker’s case.
The Administrator’s interpretation of this text—that it
applies to respondent’s operation of his Zephyr to prohibit
careless or reckless operations—is reasonable, given the
broad language of the section. . . . The Board has affirmed
the Administrator’s application of § 91.13(a) as an alleged
independent violation in other cases in which, presumably,
no other regulation would have explicitly prohibited the
alleged conduct.199
Thus, absent § 91.13(a), which expressly requires careless or reckless
conduct on the part of the operator, the FAA could not pursue an
enforcement action against Pirker. Put differently, absent a finding that
Pirker “endanger[ed] the property or life of another,” Pirker’s operation
was lawful, whether for business purposes or otherwise.200 The language
from the NTSB’s remand, the inferences drawn from Congress’s Special
Rule for Model Aircraft, and the arguments the FAA raised against
Pirker, all support the conclusion that the FAA may, at most, pursue
enforcement actions against drones flying below navigable airspace when
they are operated in a careless or reckless manner. The FAA may not
pursue any enforcement action against drone operators flying safely
below navigable airspace. Thus, the FAA’s blanket prohibition is not a
valid exercise of its current authority.
D. A Study on Micro Drones and the Risks They Pose to Navigable
Airspace
A final issue is worth addressing. Though this Note argues that the
FAA currently lacks the regulatory authority to enforce its prohibition, it
takes no position on whether Congress could grant that authority in the
future. However, presuming that Congress could extend the FAA’s
197. Id. at 1; see also Pirker Order, supra note 72, at 6 (stating that the “flight for
compensation/payment . . . appears to be for the purpose of re-classifying Respondent’s model
aircraft as [a drone] within the terminology of Notice 17-01”).
198. NTSB Order of Assessment, supra note 66.
199. Pirker Opinion and Order, supra note 76, at 9 (emphasis added).
200. 14 C.F.R. § 91.13 (2014).
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authority that far, it is by no means clear that such an extension is
necessary, as a recent report utilizing FAA data suggests.
Though researchers currently lack data to study the risks drones pose
to navigable airspace, an engineering and scientific consulting firm—
Exponent Failure Analysis Associates (Exponent)—used birds as a standin for lightweight drones (called micro UAVs in the study) to analyze the
issue.201 The primary concern of the study was the risks posed by the
interaction of drones and manned aircraft occupying navigable
airspace.202 Noting the “dearth of data” about the risks posed by drones,
Exponent relied instead on the FAA Wildlife Strike Database (Strike
Database), which records reports of wildlife aircraft strikes.203 The FAA
estimates that aircraft operators submit 39% of bird strikes to the Strike
Database.204
Exponent chose birds as an analog to drones for two reasons: (1)
aerospace vehicles are commonly segregated by weight for analysis and
regulation,205 and (2) birds are similar in weight to “micro UAVs,” drones
weighing three pounds or less.206 Exponent’s initial search of the Strike
Database limited itself to reports of bird strikes that occurred within five
or more miles of an airport and at or below 400 feet.207 Exponent found
that under those parameters, no injuries or fatalities were caused to
manned aircraft.208 Changing the parameters did not lead to significantly
different results. Exponent concluded:
Analysis of the full 24.5 years of available FAA data using
the proposed UAV regulations of 400 ft. and 5 miles from
airports (including “en route” operations of unreported
distance from airport), with small- and medium-size birds as
a surrogate for UAVs, shows that there were 34 cases of
damage to aircraft in collisions with small and medium size
birds. This search found only 6 collisions resulting in injuries
and none resulting in fatalities within these parameters.
Based on the FAA Wildlife Strike database there is no
indication that allowing UAVs of three pounds or less to
201. EXPONENT FAILURE ANALYSIS ASSOCS., UAS SAFETY ANALYSIS 38 (2014), available at
http://www.kramerlevin.com/files/upload/UAS%20America%20Fund%20Petition%20Rulemaki
ng.pdf.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. DOT Asks FAA to Do More to Reduce Bird Strikes, NAT’L BUS. AVIATION ASS’N (Sept.
21, 2012), http://www.nbaa.org/ops/safety/20120921-dot-asks-faa-to-do-more-to-reduce-birdstrikes.php.
205. UAS SAFETY ANALYSIS, supra note 201, at 3.
206. Id.
207. Id. at 5.
208. Id.
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operate at least 5 miles from airports and at or below 400 feet
will pose a significant increase in risk to manned aircraft.209
This is only one study, but it convincingly suggests that drones such
as Pirker’s—weighing a mere 1.5 pounds above the study’s parameters—
present a marginal safety risk to navigable airspace, even when flying in
navigable airspace. More importantly, it suggests that drones flying
below navigable airspace present an exceedingly minimal, if any, danger
to navigable airspace. Thus, the safety risk drones pose to airspace at any
altitude is uncertain at best. At worst, it is exaggerated. In either case, the
prudent course cannot be to stifle innovation and entrepreneurship.
Particularly not when, as one author has suggested, common law and the
existing regulatory framework has “successfully balanced innovation and
safety in a fair, efficient manner for decades.”210
CONCLUSION
For global giants such as Amazon and Google as well as sole
proprietors such as Brown and Pirker, drones offer the promise of
opportunity and the means of reaching a new commercial frontier. For
the public, drones offer the promise of substantial job creation and growth
in a still-recovering economy. For state and local governments, drones
offer millions of dollars in new tax revenue. In short, drones offer
something for everybody. While it may be true that the FAA will lift its
prohibition in time, the agency lacks the authority to impose it in the first
place. For that reason, these would-be entrepreneurs and innovators
should not have to wait.
The physical characteristics of drones, the degree to which the public
utilizes them, and the manner of their operation will almost certainly
evolve; presenting new dangers where few or none existed before.
Nevertheless, the irrational fear of a future hypothetical danger should
not serve as justification to strangle the promising innovation and
entrepreneurship of the present. Were that not the case, the world may
have never learned the names, Wilbur and Orville Wright.

209. Id. at 7.
210. F. Patrick Hubbard, “Sophisticated Robots”: Balancing Liability, Regulation, and
Innovation, 66 FLA. L. REV. 1803, 1872 (2014).
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